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Abstract
The concept of energy security can be rather difficult to precisely define. In fact, 
the scope of energy security includes a somewhat different set of issues in the 
gas sector than in the electricity sector. After all, electricity can be produced in 
every country of the European Union, but gas extraction is possible only in some. 
Natural gas is a commodity which constitutes a significant component of the export 
policy of only a few countries. As a result, the scarcity of gas in the EU makes it 
a very desirable resource for many countries, some of which are taking important 
energy-related decisions without consulting or assessing their impact on other 
Member States. This hampers the coordination of energy policy and the setting 
of common objectives with regard to energy security for the EU as a whole. The 
lack of cooperation among Member States has a clearly more negative impact on 
Poland and the other new Member States (which depend on a single gas supplier) 
than on the old EU-15, whose gas supply is generally well diversified. Moreover, 
the lack of proper infrastructure and cross-border connections puts in question the 
creation of a solid energy policy at the EU level in the gas sector.
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Résumé 
Le concept de sécurité énergétique est assez difficile à préciser. En fait dans le 
champ d’application de la sécurité énergétique, différentes sont les données dans 
le secteur du gaz par rapport celui de l’électricité. Tant que l’électricité peut être 
produite dans tous les pays de l’Union européenne, l’extraction du gaz n’est pas 
possible partout. Le gaz naturel est un produit qui constitue une composante 
importante de la politique d’exportation de quelques pays seulement. En raison 
de la pénurie de gaz dans l’UE, il est une des ressources très souhaitable par 
de nombreux pays, qui prennent des décisions importantes concernant l’énergie, 
sans consulter ni évaluer leur impact sur les autres Etats membres. Ce l’autre 
côté entrave la coordination de la politique énergétique et la fixation d’objectifs 
communs en matière de sécurité énergétique de l’UE dans son ensemble. De toute 
évidence, le manque de coopération entre les Etats membres a un impact plus 
négatif sur la Pologne et les nouveaux États membres qui dépendent d’un seul 
fournisseur de gaz dans l’ancienne UE–15, dont les sources d’approvisionnement 
sont en général bien diversifiées. Aussi le manque d’infrastructures adéquates et de 
connexions transfrontalières met en question la solidité de la politique énergétique 
au niveau de l’UE dans le secteur du gaz.
Classifications and key words: energy security, natural gas, common energy 
policy
I. Introduction
Energy security is a broad concept and one that can be quite a challenge to 
define. Despite the fact that the gas sector, along with the electricity and oil 
sectors, have a common denominator (namely in the need for diversification 
of sources and energy carriers, supply continuity, modernization and expansion 
of infrastructure), the European Union’s Member States evince differing 
circumstances as far as their domestic energy security is concerned. This is 
a result of many factors, including the historical relationships with suppliers, 
divergent standards of energy consumption, energy mixes, access to natural 
resources, dependence on imports (including from just one source), political 
pursuits, etc. Both these differences and the current practice of Member States, 
which neither consult nor analyze the impact of their decisions regarding 
energy on the remaining states of the European Union, hinder implementation 
of a common energy policy at the EU level. This results in the lack of a shared 
position as far as energy security matters are concerned.
The clearest example of the lack of cooperation among Member States is in 
the gas sector. Obviously, such lack of cooperation has a more disadvantageous 
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influence on Poland and the other new Member States which depend on 
a single supplier, than on the old EU-15. Furthermore, Poland (as several 
other new Member States likewise dependent on foreign energy supplies) 
faces additional challenges stemming from its proximity to and relationship 
with Russia, the EU’s main gas partner. Important differences can be seen in 
several areas: the structure of energy use (energy mix), energy dependence, 
infrastructure, and the politicization of the issue.1 The first important difference 
between the energy situation of Poland and that of the Western European 
countries has to do with the fact that the Central and Eastern European 
(CEE) countries in general have a much higher level of energy dependence 
on a single source – namely, Russia – than do other European countries. 
While in Western European countries the level of dependency on a single 
source hardly exceeds 30%, the CEE countries’ level of energy dependency 
on Russian gas ranges from 50 to100%. For Poland it is around 65%.2 The 
difference between CEE and Western Europe is marked by further disparity 
in the effectiveness and quality of infrastructure and facilities, as well as the 
role energy plays in politics. For many decision-makers in the CEE countries 
the legacy of relations with the former Soviet Union casts a shadow over trade 
with today’s Russia. For Poland and other CEE states, mistrust and fear spoil 
the perception of their relationship with their main gas supplier. This is an 
element that is not present in the relationship between other European states 
and their suppliers, be it Norway, Algeria, or Russia.
This article presents legal, economic, and political aspects of regulating 
Poland’s energy security within the context of EU energy policy in light of 
the challenges that remain. These challenges include differing standards of 
energy consumption, differing energy mixes and access to natural resources, 
along with dependence on imports, infrastructural obstacles, and political 
initiatives both at the EU and domestic level. Finally, this article attempts 
to answer whether a common European energy policy at the current stage of 
EU integration is possible and what the potential is for further progress in 
this field.
1 For more on this see A. Rulska, The European Union Energy Policy: An Initiative in 
Progress. Paper presented at the Conference in April 2006 at the Central and East European 
International Studies Association – University of Tartu, Estonia. 
2 B. Nowak, ‘Forging the External Dimension of the Energy Policy of the European Union’ 
(2010) 23 The Electricity Journal, pp. 57–67.
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II. The security of the gas sector 
The term ‘energy security’ is interpreted a bit differently in the gas sector 
than in the electricity sector. The reason for this is quite simple: whereas 
electricity can be produced in every country of the EU, gas extraction is 
possible only in a few. Natural gas is a commodity which constitutes an 
important component of the export policy of some countries: as such it enters 
the game of global trends of supply and demand 3. 
Therefore the question of the security of gas supplies should be considered 
with respect to two areas:4
a) short-term security of supply – which depends on particular Member 
States that are obliged to undertake all possible and proper regulatory 
measures to determine their security aims and define the range of 
competence and responsibilities among market participants according 
to those security aims;
b) long-term security of supply – which must include various strategic and 
geopolitical matters, both on the domestic and the EU level, concerned 
with ensuring the proper diversification of supply and investments in 
infrastructure, in order to enable meeting the growing demand for gas, 
especially in the face of more and more powerful dependence on supply 
from Russia.
The political conditions of Poland’s energy security are undoubtedly more 
visible in the gas sector than in the electricity or oil sector. Among others 
reasons, this results from the fact that Poland cannot satisfy internal demand 
for gas from its own sources (which cover around one-third of domestic 
demand), thus it is forced to import. Currently Poland extracts from its own 
mineral deposits – via Polish Oil and Gas Company S.A. (PGNiG S.A.) 
(hereinafter PGNiG) – around 3.9 bln m3/ a year of gas and imports from 
Russia around 9.5 bln m3/ a year5. It is worth emphasizing that Russia, which 
has gas reserves estimated at 48 trillion cubic meters6 (approximately 35% of 
3 There are obviously some other questions which could and even should be considered 
while discussing demand and supply for gas, e.g., long-term contracts for supplies and contracts 
of take or pay types. This topic however is far too broad for the present work. 
4 For more on this topic see also: ‘Provisions on supply security in gas sector’, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/electricity/legislation/doc/notes_for_implementation_2004/security_
of_gas_supply_en.pdf
5 B. Nowak, Energy Policy of the EU. Chosen legal and political aspects and their implications 
for Poland, WAiP, Warsaw 2009, p. 103.
6 The International Comparative Legal Guide to: Gas Regulation 2007. A practical insight to 
cross-border Gas regulation work – Russia. Global Legal Group, p. 197. See also M. Kaczmarski 
M., Bezpieczeństwo energetyczne w Unii Europejskiej, WAiP, Warszawa 2010.
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world resources), is the main gas player in the EU, which possesses only 4% 
of world resources of natural gas7. Thus, Russia’s enormous gas resources, 
coupled with great demand and the high price of this resource, enables Russia 
to use gas as a tool of political pressure, especially towards countries which 
do not possess sufficient resources and whose sources of acquiring gas are not 
diversified. Among those who purchase Russian gas such behaviour prompts 
them to ensure energy security, e.g., through diversification of gas supplies. 
Such diversification, however, is not only a problem for Poland or a few other 
Member States, but of the EU as a whole. Therefore, the diversification of 
sources of acquiring energy carriers should be treated from the EU perspective, 
or at least in terms of the internal energy market as far as gas supply go. 
The internal European gas market, in turn, favours diversification of sources 
of supply thanks to the closer integration and cooperation of domestic gas 
markets.
Additionally, the greater power and negotiating position of energy 
companies in the EU is an asset of an integrated market, which is important 
for ensuring for themselves energy sources on world markets, as results from 
a bigger choice of delivery systems and easier access to final users. This is 
particularly important in the case of the EU’s strong dependence on one 
importer. Whereas in 2001 outside supply covered 31% of the EU’s demand 
for natural gas, by 2025 the EU’s import needs for gas will have grown to 
an estimated 60% of its consumption8. Besides all this, competitive markets 
favour achieving diversification because they are able to react more flexibly 
to changes of supply and demand on world markets. However, we need 
remember that there are still serious problems which impede the proper 
functioning of the integrated European gas market. This includes the lack 
of cross-border connections (interconnections) and the lack of proper 
LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) infrastructure in countries having access to 
the sea.
Apart from infrastructure, another fundamental problem is the lack of 
a common position among the Member States as far as gas supplies are 
concerned, as this significantly hinders the formation of a consistent policy 
at the EU level. Some EU Member States negotiate long-term contracts, 
especially with Gazprom, being motivated rather more by domestic political 
reasons than the aim of taking care of supply security seen from the overall 
European perspective. From the point of view of Gazprom, the situation is 
obviously altogether convenient. It is clear that no highly liberalized market 
7 N. Cornwall, ‘International trade in gas and prospects for UK gas supplies’ [in:] Robins 
C. (ed) Regulating Utilities and Promoting Competition. Lessons for the Future, Edward Elgar, 
2006, p. 46.
8 Ibidem., p. 45
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in Europe would appeal to Gazprom business strategy, as Gazprom wishes to 
guarantee itself long-term contracts with large, dominant companies and does 
not opt for liquid markets, where smaller entities, placed lower in the chain 
of supply, will compete to buy energy resources from it. This understanding 
seems to have been confirmed by Sergey Korovin, Deputy Head of Gazprom’s 
Foreign Economic Relations Department, in an interview with in Gas 
Matters9, when he said Gazprom would rather negotiate with its old customers 
and stick to long-term contracts. Since that works, why change things? 
It is obvious that it is far easier for Gazprom to enter the European 
market through cooperation with large, dominant players instead of through 
developing contacts with small and scattered entities. Besides, the high prices 
of gas maintain Gazprom’s strong position as a main actor on the European 
upstream market and possibly on the downstream market in the future, too. 
Among the methods for loosening the tight straitjacket imposed by Gazprom 
and diminishing the risk of lack of gas supplies for European industry 
(especially for the power industry) are the development of nuclear power, 
carbon capture storage technology, and renewable sources. 
But even so, electricity generated from renewable sources does not diminish 
the risk of Europe gas supply being cut off, as gas is used for other aims 
than the production of electricity – namely, for heating, kitchen usage, and 
the nitrogen and petrochemical industries. As a matter of fact, the EU is 
now in quite a difficult situation., for the lack of solidarity and joint policy 
at the EU level gives Gazprom broader possibilities to negotiate upstream 
contracts with individual Member States. Unfortunately, one has to admit 
that the EU is partially responsible for this state of affairs. For instance, 
having signed the Energy Charter Treaty, the EU then lost its impetus in 
attending to its gas and oil negotiations with Russia at the end of the 90s. 
At that time the price of gas was relatively low and Russia direly needed the 
influx of foreign investment. For the gas companies of the EU this constituted 
a perfect opportunity for safeguarding their interests in supply and for starting 
cooperation with the state-owned Russian companies. Today, the price of gas 
is high and demand is constantly growing. Therefore, Russia is able to either 
develop its own technologies or buy them from independent partners without 
disposing of its own resources in favour of foreign companies. As a result, 
the future of the international agreements like the Energy Charter Treaty 
(which binds the countries which ratified it to open their energy markets for 
foreign companies) looks rather gloomy, at least for as long as the prices of gas 
stay high.
9 The dominant European entities resist the division of property, Gas Matters March 
2007 p. 20.
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The main obstacle for the Russian authorities, which did not ratify the 
Energy Charter Treaty, is the Energy Charter Transit Protocol, according to 
which the admission of foreign companies to national transport infrastructure 
is provided under internal tariffs. As a result countries such as Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan – having large oil and 
gas resources and desiring to transport them to the EU on favorable terms 
through the territory of Russia – would be able to do so under the umbrella 
of a legally binding Treaty. In fact, all these countries have signed and ratified 
the Energy Charter Treaty and are directly interested in Russia’s ratification of 
the Energy Charter Treaty. Russia, on the other hand, is afraid that ratifying 
the Energy Charter Treaty will increase the influence of the Central Asian and 
Caspian countries on the world gas and oil market, and thus decrease Russia’s 
control over commodity streams on the world market along with its dominant 
influence on political decisions in the region.10 Russian apprehensions are 
confirmed by the fact that the cost of gas in the Caspian countries is below 
the average in Russia. Therefore it is rather clear that Russia’s ratification of 
the Energy Charter Treaty would increase deliveries of gas from Central Asia 
and the Caspian countries to the EU markets, thus potentially decreasing the 
flow of Russian gas to the EU.11 From the EU perspective a wider spectrum 
of choices as to gas sources would not only increase the security of supply, but 
also reduce the price of gas delivered to Europe in general.
Lastly, it is of course true that Europe is dependent on gas from Russia. 
But the converse is also true: the EU is Russia’s largest client. If Russia loses 
credibility as a reliable supplier of gas, it stands to lose future revenues. 
However, two main issues seem to hamper a healthy relationship between 
the EU and Russia when it comes to supplies of energy: Russia’s refusal to 
ratify the European Energy Charter, and the liberalizing energy networks 
within Russia without granting to it access to the EU.12
Finally, taking into consideration the strong position of Russia on the 
energy resources market and their use as an element of foreign policy, it 
seems that the need to work out a common policy concerning the security of 
gas supplies to the EU is an issue of a great importance on the present stage 
of European integration.
10 For more on this see B. Nowak, Energy Policy of the EU…, p. 106.
11 See for instance M. Nowacki’s point of view, Prawne aspekty bezpieczeństwa energetycznego 
w UE, Wolters Kluwer, Warszawa 2010, p. 365.
12 For more on this see “The EU’s energy dilemma: with or without Russia?” EU Business. 
March 22, 2006. Available at: http://www.eubusiness.com/Energy/russia.2006-03-22. 
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III. Poland and its gas concerns
The problem with a joint energy policy, one that takes into account 
European dependence on gas imports (especially dependence on Russia), 
rests also on the disparity in perceptions toward Russia between new Member 
States and the old Member States. Poland, supported by the Baltic States, 
envisaged the European Union as an organization that would move quickly to 
reduce its energy dependence on Russia, and that the EU itself would adopt 
a much tougher and collective position in relations with Russia. But Germany 
and France did not seem to fathom the legacy of difficult relations with the 
Soviet Union for the CEE countries, and thus stated they were unwilling to 
isolate Russia, preferring instead to engage in a long-term energy relationship 
beneficial to both sides. For France and Germany, where imports of gas from 
Russia constitute around 30% of all imported gas, cooperation with Russia 
is not perceived as deeply threatening to the domestic security of supply. For 
Poland and other CEE countries, in turn, where dependence on Russian gas 
ranges between 60% and 100%, close cooperation with the former regional 
hegemon is politically hard to accept. Nevertheless, one has to remember 
that, apart from the political baggage, Russia is an important trading partner 
for Poland.
From the Polish perspective, a certain safeguarding of the continuity of 
gas supply and energy security sensu largo is seen in a section of the Lisbon 
Treaty, which deals in particular with energy solidarity among EU countries 
in the case of crisis in the supply of energy resources. Article 194 section 1 of 
the Treaty stipulates: 
‘In the context of the establishment and functioning of the internal market 
and with regard for the need to preserve and improve the environment, Union 
policy on energy shall aim, in a spirit of solidarity between Member States, to: 
(…) b) ensure security of energy supply in the Union;’
The Treaty’s idea for security of supply and energy solidarity in the EU 
can only be safeguarded by properly functioning domestic energy systems. To 
achieve this the European Union supports the Member States in modernizing 
the old and building new elements of energy infrastructure system by secondary 
and soft law acts. In the Communication of the European Commission on the 
Report on progress in creating the internal gas and electricity market13, the 
Commission stated the following: ‘Access to new gas sources usually requires 
the construction of new transport infrastructure, pipelines or liquefied natural 
13 The Communication of the European Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament about the Report on progress in creating the internal gas and electricity market, 
{SEC(2005) 1448 p. 14.
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gas (LNG) facilities. In this respect the EU will need to give increasing focus on 
the strategic dimension of its energy relations with third countries, particularly 
suppliers, and how their deepening can contribute to the functioning of the 
EU’s energy markets. The recent decisions taken by investors to launch 
a number of new LNG terminal projects in the EU constitute progress in this 
respect. Other pipeline and LNG projects need to follow and the dialogue 
with gas-producing countries must be intensified. LNG imports from new 
producing regions are already becoming a competitive alternative in some 
cases.’
The Treaty’s idea for energy solidarity among the EU Member States, 
however, deals with the situation where Member State X is in need and where 
Member State Y has appropriate resources and infrastructure to help. Now, 
Poland in the case of a general crisis in gas supplies to the EU would be 
altogether in need. The lack of underground storage and supply infrastructure 
alternative to pipelines such as LNG terminals, not only puts Poland in a bad 
situation in the case of supply disruptions through gas pipelines, but also 
weakens and limits its active participation in making key decisions for the 
functioning of the EU’s gas market.
Here it is worth noting that Poland reacted suspiciously to the matter of 
including a separate energy chapter into the Lisbon Treaty. Poland’s Euro-
sceptic government at that time claimed that it would accept new articles on 
climate change and energy as long as doing so did not mean more powers for 
the EU. Ironically, at that very same time Poland was the most enthusiastic 
supporter of inserting into the Treaty an energy solidarity clause in the case 
of serious supply problems, thus undermining its own policy on the energy 
article. It seems that this position was a result of a certain lack of preparation 
with regard to energy issues. 
In fact the inclusion of energy into the Treaty of Lisbon as an area of 
shared competencies should be perceived as an attempt to establish 
a ‘special cooperation modus operandi between the Community and national 
governments in the interest of greater transparency with respect to energy 
markets. Transferring some of the energy competencies from the control of 
national governments to the EU level shall accelerate necessary changes in 
further liberalization of the electricity and gas markets.
The question of diversification of supply sources itself (meaning the security 
of supply and energy solidarity) is a particularly hot political issue in Poland 
– and in other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, as well. The difficult 
geographic and geopolitical location of these countries and strong dependence 
upon Russian resources (gas and oil) enhances the fact that Russia, to a great 
extent, particularly in the case of the Baltic countries, considers this part of 
the EU to be an area of its traditional influence. In connection with this, the 
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clause on energy solidarity in the case of crises in resource supplies (especially 
from the eastern direction) is perceived by the CEE countries’ leaders as 
a protective device against Russian ambitions14. Additionally, Poland (as 
the other new EU Member States) is far more dependent on one source of 
gas supply – Russia – than are the old Member States. As a matter of fact, 
the difficult historical relations between Russia and the Central and Eastern 
Europe countries and the current policy of Russia towards the Baltic countries 
have a negative influence on the new Member States’ perception of Russia as 
a main gas trade partner of the EU.
Hence, the close cooperation between Germany and Russia (as far as 
gas goes) is difficult to accept for decision-makers in Poland and the Baltic 
countries, which are afraid of Russia regaining domination in the region. 
Therefore the matter of diversification of gas supply sources became even 
more fiery after the German government strengthened relations with Russia 
and formed a consortium responsible for building Nord Stream (the Northern 
pipeline) along the bottom of the Baltic Sea. This project is perceived by 
political decision makers in the Central and Eastern Europe countries as an 
offence and as an instance of German selfishness in solving a problem that 
in fact concerns the EU as a whole. Poland, having been omitted from the 
project, feels its energy security is thereby imperiled. Moreover, the fact that 
Germany (more than others) has staked its bets on strengthening relations 
with Russia, allows us to speak of special or strategic relations between Russia 
and Germany. Such a special relation with regard to energy sources, especially 
between those two countries, is difficult to accept for the new Member States, 
and especially the Baltic countries.15
Some experts argue16 that the realization of this project will detach Polish 
and Western European security of supply, thus undermining European 
solidarity and the prospects for the emergence of a common external energy 
policy at the EU level. However this seems fairy unlikely especially in the case 
where the Nord Stream project is perceived by the European Commission 
as a strategic investment for European energy (gas) security. From the point 
view of Poland, the most negative element of the pipeline construction is 
14 More on this topic – see also B. Nowak, Bezpieczeństwo energetyczne Polski a bezpie-
czeństwa energetyczne Unii Europejskiej, Krytyka Prawa. Niezależne Studia nad Prawem, Vol. 2 
– Bezpieczeństwo red. Wojciech Sokolewicz, WAiP, Warszawa 2010.
15 For more on this see A. Rahr, Germany and Russia: A special Relationship. The Center for 
Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2007, p. 1. 
See also A. Gusev, Energy Relations between the European Union and Russia: content, problems, 
prospects. Institut Europeen des Hautes Etudes Internationales, Nice 2008, pp. 68–74. Available 
at: http://www.iehei.org/bibliotheque/memoires2008/Gusev.pdf. 
16 E. Wyciszkiewicz, ‘One for All – All for One – The Polish Perspective on External 
European Energy Policy’ (2007) 8 Foreign Policy in Dialogue 20, pp. 34–44.
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the fact that Poland will lose out considerably as a transit country: after 
all, that status has been essential in negotiation policy towards the Russian 
partner. Paradoxically, the recent conclusion of Polish-Russian negotiations 
regarding the Jamal gas contract might also provide some complications for 
Polish energy policy. Namely, the Russian national champion – Gazprom – in 
the course of negotiations gave up its moderate control over gas transit on 
Polish territory to Germany (Gazprom is using around 75% of the Jamal 
pipeline capacity by sending yearly 34 billion cubic meters to Germany and 
around 9.5 billion cubic meters to PGNiG SA). EuRoPol Gaz17, which so 
far has been the system operator for the Jamal pipeline, was replaced by 
the Gaz-System (Polish state-owned transmission system operator). This may 
be considered a very sophisticated move, whereby with Gazprom giving up 
control over transit, it seeks to relocate in the future its gas delivery to German 
to the newly constructed pipeline Nord Stream, slowly downgrading transit 
through the Jamal. This of course would further and significantly diminish the 
role of Poland as a transit country. From the Russian perspective, omitting 
transit countries (thus avoiding transit fees) shall be considered an important 
factor behind the decision to construct Nord Stream. It seems that Poland 
now has nothing to do but to join the already begun investment into Nord 
Stream and quickly finish construction of its LNG terminal, which will partially 
diversify the sources of gas supply. Germany might be a very good example 
here. It acquires gas from four sources: (i) from home, (ii) from the North 
Sea, (iii) from Russia, and (iv) from import of liquefied gas (LNG) from the 
Arab countries. Such diversification – 20–30% from each direction – makes 
Germany independent of sundry political and economic turbulences. What is 
more important, it enables Germany to maintain a flexible and economically 
rational gas policy.
In the case of Poland a certain complement to import by gas pipelines 
and to an LNG terminal might be the extraction of shale gas. One should 
remember, however, that this is a complicated, expensive process which for 
the time being does not guarantee the safeguarding of Poland’s gas interest. 
Thus, Poland should invest in new technologies, but not resign from already 
accepted and functioning solutions. Moreover, the long-term contract signed 
by Poland (excluding Gazprom) with the companies Statoil (Norway) and 
DONG (Denmark) to import gas seem to be a rational solution to diversify 
the supply of this resource. 
17 EuRoPol Gaz Transit Pipeline System was incorporated as a joint stock company on 
September 23, 1993. The company consisted of three shareholders: PGNiG SA (48% of shares), 
Gazprom (48% of shares), and Gas-Trading (4% of shares). Gas-Trading conducts business in 
the field of investment, manufacturing, trade, and services – as well as foreign trade. EuRoPol 
Gaz was mainly responsible for the operation and maintenance of the Jamal gas pipeline. 
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We should bear in mind, however, that diversification of sources of gas 
supply must run parallel to the development of infrastructure, which means 
modernization and development of transmission pipelines, interconnections 
with neighbouring countries, and gas underground storage facilities. In 
Poland’s case this is even more important, because the majority of Polish gas 
pipelines run from east to west. Thus, to make maximum use of the contracts 
with the Scandinavian countries, a transmission network from the north to 
the south, connected with the east-west network, is needed. Interconnections 
with Germany, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia (which are slated for 
construction), would in fact have a double impact on Polish energy security. 
On the one hand, cross-border connections would significantly improve the 
security of supply, since in the event of any disruption in supply from the 
east, Poland could receive gas supplies from the west. On the other hand, it 
would increase competition on the domestic market, since there would be 
more gas on the Polish market which is not shipped and delivered by the 
national champion (PGNiG S.A.).
In Poland, where gas is imported mainly from the east, and through the 
territory of several countries, we see the problem of relations with countries 
of unstable political and economic systems (e.g., Belarus, less so Ukraine), 
what with their inclinations to make use of their own infrastructure as a factor 
in achieving their own objectives in regional policy. Any breaks in supply 
continuity inevitably have a negative impact on Polish industry, and at the 
same time on the country’s energy security.
The strategic element of gas infrastructure that far more strengthens the 
security of gas supplies and the independence of the directions of supplies is 
the LNG terminal. Recent events regarding the problems of gas supplies to 
the EU clearly indicate the necessity to possess expanded infrastructure.
The European Community, aware of the uncertainty which dominates the 
energy resources markets, in 2004 issued a directive of the Council 2004/67/
EC18 concerning measures to safeguard the security of natural gas supplies. 
This directive was recently repealed by regulation No 994/2010 of October 
20, 2010 concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supplies19. The 
aim of the 2004/67/EC directive, as well as regulation no. 994/2010, was to 
ensure an adequate level of security of gas supplies to Member States, which 
contributes to the proper functioning of the internal gas market expressed 
in directive 2003/55/EC (repealed by directive 2009/73/EC) dealing with the 
18 Council Directive 2004/67/EC of 26 April 2004 concerning measures to safeguard security 
of natural gas supply, OJ [2004] L 127/92.
19 Regulation No 994/2010 of the European Parliament and Council of 20 October 2010 
concerning measures to safeguard security of gas supply, OJ [2010] L 295/1. 
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common rules for creating an internal gas market20. Due to the principle of 
subsidiary, directive 2004/67/EC did not impose on Member States strictly 
defined means for achieving the aim of the secure functioning of the domestic 
gas systems, but only suggests certain measures which are intended to lead 
to that aim. One of the main devices for implementing the policy of supply 
security indicated in the directive is nothing other than an LNG terminal. 
Regulation no. 994/2010 also points out LNG terminals as an important 
tool for securing gas supplies. In fact, regulation no. 994/2010 also supports 
regional cooperation involving natural gas enterprises, Member States, and 
national regulatory authorities designed to enhance the security of supply and 
the integration of the internal energy market. This includes the three regional 
gas markets under the Gas Regional Initiative: (i) the Gas Platform, (ii) the 
High Level Group of the Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan, and 
(iii) the Security of Supply Coordination Group of the Energy Community. 
Poland’s integration with neighbouring countries through interconnections 
shall be seen as an important step toward securing gas supplies.
Returning to the LNG terminal, it should be pointed out that all the biggest 
EU countries (Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Spain) possess 
at least one LNG terminal. If Poland (with the same population as Spain) 
wishes to matter in the game and be a partner in gas dialogue with the biggest 
countries and Russia, it must have an infrastructure which is complementary (if 
not alternative) to the pipeline infrastructure. In other words, Poland’s lack of 
an LNG terminal is a great obstacle to pursuing a viable policy of diversifying 
energy sources. One example of such a viable policy of diversification is the 
Polish oil sector. For although almost 90% of the oil used in Poland comes 
from import – almost all of it from Russia – it is gas, not oil, which is the 
bigger problem today.
Poland has the possibilities of oil import in an amount satisfying the 
country’s needs – by the pipeline Przyjaźń (Friendship) and by sea through 
Naftoport in connection with the points in the North Harbour in Gdańsk. 
The trans-ship capacity of Naftoport is now 23 mln tons21. Together with the 
trans-ship capacity of the points in the Northern Harbour in Gdańsk this gives 
around 34 mln tons a year, with domestic demand for oil in 2008 being around 
18.5 mln tons.22 Moreover, the last modernization of Naftoport (above all the 
basin enlargement, which introduced tankers to Naftoport with a displacement 
20 Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 
concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas, OJ [2003] L 176/57, as amended 
by the directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of July 13 2009 
concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas, OJ [2009] L 211/94.
21 http://www.naftoport.pl/index.php?n=16. 
22 www.pern.com.pl. 
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of over 300 thousand tons), enables the transit of Russian oil through the 
territory of Poland in two new directions: to the US and to China. 
The transit of a volume of 10 mln tons does not only considerably increase 
the rank of Naftoport on the Baltic sea, but above all positively impacts 
Poland’s energy security. This is because on the territory of Poland there is 
more oil (in transit) that could (in a crisis situation) be redirected to the needs 
of the Polish refining industry. Nothing prevents similar solutions from being 
adopted in the gas sector. 
The building of an LNG terminal is a long and expensive process. Moreover, 
the world LNG market (due to a great increase of demand) is now the producer’s 
market and it is the latter that decides about the attractiveness and the risk of 
a given project. In connection with this it is advisable to find a strategic partner 
who could manage a minority block of shares in the investment. This should 
be a partner who not only has experience in LNG technology, but also a wide 
network of contacts with LNG producers. It could also be an LNG producer. 
What is more, the rule of buying capacity in different terminals to sell gas 
where it is the most advantageous has become popular among the producers.
IV. Conclusions
The present practice of individual Member States to take important energy-
related decisions without consulting or assessing their impact on other Member 
States hampers the coordination of energy policy and the establishment of 
common objectives for the EU as a whole. Another important issue is the 
endowment of Member States with natural resources. Some of the countries 
are producers (such as the UK and the Netherlands), while the majority are 
energy-importing countries. As a result there is a great variation in the level of 
import dependence among EU countries, which fact, apart from the disparity 
in relations with Russia among Member States, creates a rather difficult 
obstacle to energy market integration. Other significant reasons impeding a 
joint approach in energy policy include differences in the energy mixes of the 
Member States and the divergent structure of national energy sectors. This 
predetermines different national energy priorities and sets the pattern for 
respective energy policies such as protectionism. Protectionist trends are most 
visible in France and Poland. The first fears that in an open market it could 
lose its national champions, and the second that its energy sector will end 
up under Russian control, giving rise to energy insecurity. Finally, additional 
infrastructure must be built to strengthen the existing networks and ensure the 
development of cross-border markets, as these measures would likely improve 
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the security of supply, guarantee a high level of public service, and maximize 
the benefits expected by consumers. 
To overcome the domination of national interests, the EU does not only 
have to work out a common energy policy, but EU institutions together 
with Member States have to create a competitive internal European energy 
market and a system of energy solidarity in the case of supply crisis to the EU. 
Possible cooperation would involve: diversification of resource supplies and 
sources and types of energy carrier; building elements of market cooperation 
between energy sectors; and creating stable conditions for investments. The 
EU Reform Treaty (The Lisbon Treaty) in its provisions concerning energy 
should constitute an impulse to act in the area of common energy policy. It 
should also be the basis for issuing a range of legal acts pertaining to the 
energy solidarity expected by Poland and other new EU Member States. 
However, to put theory into practice, the EU as a whole will not only have 
to create proper rules of the game, e.g., anti-crisis plans, but also support 
the investment process in expanding energy infrastructure involving LNG 
terminals, underground storage facilities, pipelines, and interconnections 
between systems. The role of the particular Member State is to establish the 
political and legal frameworks needed for the network to be developed, in 
particular by promoting major gas supply infrastructure projects especially 
within the European Union, but outside it, too. For then those solutions, in 
connection with the European internal energy market, will allow the Member 
States to possess comparable energy mixes and import dependencies in line 
with their similar interests and expectations towards a common energy policy. 
Finally, since economic indicators show that the current demand for energy 
services greatly exceeds the available supply, Poland’s growing energy needs 
will require both domestic and foreign direct investment. The opening of the 
energy sector to private investment as a mean of alleviating energy shortages 
in Poland’s transition economy is not an option but a necessity that over the 
years has become increasingly urgent. Poland suffers from a long-standing 
lack of investments in production capacity and infrastructure (re: transmission 
pipelines, underground storage, LNG terminals). In order to attract potential 
strategic investors, the Polish government must reduce the risk that its current 
policies pose: it must significantly enhance transparency in government 
institutions and create a governmental climate favourable to economic growth. 
Rapid increases in energy demand require solutions that attract domestic and 
foreign capital. The Polish government needs a policy that reflects the interest 
of investors and consumers who in the long run will pay for the necessary 
investments in energy security. 
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